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ABSTRACT: Over the past few years, the EU has been challenged by multiple disintegration forces 
sustained by a growing number of Eurosceptic citizens. In this critical scenario, Italy has emerged as a 
relevant case because of its transformation from a leading pro-integration country to a country where EU 
integration is an increasingly divisive issue. We explore the relationship between Italian public opinion and 
the EU, with a specific interest in understanding how the coronavirus crisis may affect such a relationship, 
supposing that our case study may also be revealing as to how a crisis context can produce effects on the 
popular legitimacy of the EU. We show that in Italy there is demand from some majoritarian segments of 
society for stronger cooperation in the EU. To explain the apparent paradox of why Italians decreasingly 
feel that their country benefits from the EU but still want to increase EU cooperation in certain areas, we 
turn to the argument of the public’s instrumental approach to the principle of burden-sharing: citizens 
support deeper integration to face the costs of the most pressing crises affecting the country and the EU at 
large. 
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1. Introduction  
  
Over the past few years, the EU has been challenged by multiple disintegration forces (Brexit, the rise of 
Eurosceptic parties) sustained by a growing number of Eurosceptic citizens. These challenges to the EU 
process show that nowadays the EU is more dependent on public approval for legitimacy than ever before 
(Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2009). In this critical scenario, Italy has emerged as a relevant 
case because of its transformation from a leading pro-integration country to a country where EU integration is 
an issue that more and more divides society. In this article, we explore the relationship between Italian public 
opinion and the EU, with a specific interest in understanding how the coronavirus crisis may affect such a 
relationship. We examine how Italian citizens perceive the role of the EU in managing the most pressing crises 
of our times (with a specific focus on the coronavirus pandemic) and the imbalances they introduce, supposing, 
at the same time, that our case study may be revealing as to how a crisis context can produce effects on the 
popular legitimacy of the EU. We address the question of the conditions under which Italian citizens would be 
ready to support greater cooperation to face global challenges. We mainly focus on utilitarian calculation under 
the assumption that its influence may accrue in crisis situations. 
With differing intensity, all EU countries have been affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, Italy 
found itself in the eye of the storm as one of the most exposed member states and the first country in Europe 
where coronavirus cases began to surface. Italy is also one of Europe's worst-hit countries in terms of deaths. 
Due to the severity of the pandemic here, the Italian government was the first in the continent to order a total 
lockdown during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic and for the longest period of time. The longer-
term impact of coronavirus lockdown measures may also make Italy one of the worst hit Eurozone states in 
economic terms. The European Commission predicted that Italy’s debt would jump to 158.9% of GDP in 2020, 
its highest rate since World War II (it was 134.8% in 2019, the second highest in the EU), mainly as a result 
of the exceptional measures put in place to fight coronavirus and its effects on the domestic economy and on 
society. All these problems have distressed a country already hit by the long-term effects of the Great 
Recession and by slow economic growth (Italy has still not reached the real economic output it had before 
2008).  
In the article, we discuss how the pandemic may be an opportunity for the EU to increase its legitimacy in 
Italian public opinion. We argue that the costs of transnational crises for member states, especially for those 
countries that are most exposed, may produce public demand for EU intervention. The coronavirus crisis has 
created the ideal conditions under which Italian citizens could be ready to support greater EU cooperation over 
matters currently subject to the exclusive authority of member states. Also, due to its exposure to multiple 
crises, based on past studies (Conti et al 2020) we argue that Italy is a country (certainly not the only one) 
where instrumental support for EU policy intervention is high in this period. This posture is sustained by 
interest in sharing with the other member states the burden of the imbalances induced by crises. By burden-
sharing, we refer to mechanisms of fair redistribution of burdens across EU members states under EU 
coordination when they are disproportionately affecting only some of its members. In this respect, we show 
that even in countries like Italy, where support for the EU was at a historic minimum before the onset of the 
pandemic, in a context like the current one a sense of insecurity and grievance among citizens may turn into 
demands for EU aid and initiatives.   
In the article, we contend the argument, raised in the literature, that the chances that crises may provide a 
stepping stone to major leaps forward in EU integration through public opinion are remote (de Wilde 2021). 








elites to convince their electorates to support further integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009), we maintain that 
the challenge of coronavirus might represent an opportunity for the same EU to garner increased trust from the 
public and to promote itself as chief manager of the response to crises. This is, of course, not easy to attain 
politically. Although the concept of solidarity is clearly affirmed in the acquis communautaire and the Lisbon 
Treaty (Ross and Borgmann-Prebil 2010), in the EU there is no institutionalisation of internal solidarity 
equivalent to that present within its member states (Ferrera 2009). Hence, the demand for solidarity might 
easily be frustrated in the EU because of an institutional failure to deliver it. The efforts made by the EU 
institutions to find an agreement with national governments on mechanisms to help EU countries weather the 
coronavirus crisis is proof of the difficulties in creating internal solidarity, but also of its essentialness. 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, we consider challenges to (and opportunities for) EU 
legitimacy in Italy during the coronavirus crisis, we formulate the working hypotheses that will guide our study 
and present our data and method. This is followed by two sections dedicated to the analysis of EU attitudes 
among Italian public opinion in the context of the pandemic. A conclusive section summarises the main results 
of our analysis and proposes some avenues for future research.    
 
 
2. Why Italians should support greater cooperation: a framework for analysis 
 
Despite a negative trend in EU support, but in line with our findings on public demand for greater 
cooperation (see our figure 2 below), in a recent study, Conti et al. (2020) show that the majority of Italians 
request greater EU authority in crucial policy fields such as immigration and security. These fields have 
become particularly sensitive in the recent past due to increased numbers of immigrants (with Italy playing the 
role of transit for migration into the EU) and to Islamic terrorism. The authors show that Italians prefer to pool 
resources at the European level to manage the most pressing challenges of our days. At first sight, public 
attitudes towards the EU may appear somewhat paradoxical in Italy. Citizens tend to support more EU 
authority in policy as well as further EU integration in general, even when there is a negative trend in their EU 
attitudes as documented above. This is true both with respect to those areas where the impact of crises on the 
country’s interests has been more severe (e.g., immigration, with Italy as one of the most exposed countries) 
as well as milder (e.g., security where, in the past, terrorist attacks have not touched the country directly). One 
may logically assume that the same will apply to the coronavirus crisis, which has displayed its detrimental 
effects on both health security and economic growth in the country.  
Hence, from past analyses it appears evident that support for burden-sharing within the EU is highly 
majoritarian in Italy: citizens in this country want to share the burden of crises-led imbalances among all 
member states. The level of exposure of Italy to recent crises makes support for burden-sharing in this country 
appear strongly rooted in instrumentalism. In this light, the decline of general support for EU membership can 
be interpreted as a sign of disenchantment with EU achievements. Italian citizens evaluate the EU primarily in 
relation to the costs and benefits for their own country; they focus on the gains that membership is able to 
produce, possibly in the same way they would consider other levels of government. In some way, this is a sign 
of progress achieved by European integration, with the EU more pragmatically embedded in mechanisms of 
popular assessment of its institutional performance and policy output (Conti and Memoli 2015). Italians’ 
longstanding belief that the national system is broken and that the EU’s external constraint helps the country 
to progress (Dyson and Featherstone 1996) has largely been replaced by a more disenchanted cost/benefit 
analysis. This disenchantment has taken place against a backdrop of economic recession, and a fear of 
uncontrolled immigration and of terrorism. This evidence shows that, contrary to major assumptions following 
post-functionalist arguments about the primacy of identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009), especially in times of 
  
 






crisis, instrumental calculation plays a major role in the explanation of support for the EU (Gomez 2015; Braun 
and Tausendpfund 2014).  
In every political structure, the adoption of burden-sharing measures can be motivated by cost–benefit 
considerations, or by a sense of solidarity based on reciprocity between the members of that community, or 
the two logics can be complementary (Thielemann 2012). Beyond calculation, it should be noted that support 
for burden-sharing is a widespread notion in Italian society, not only with respect to those challenges to which 
Italy is more directly exposed, but also in more general terms. For example, on the occasion of the bailout 
loans to Greece that were necessary during the financial crisis to rescue the country from default, the Italian 
contribution to this joint effort went undisputed: there was no internal opposition to this financial backing 
(despite Italy also being in a recession) from any segment of society. We take this as evidence of the fact that 
the notion of EU solidarity among Italians appears not necessarily confined to fields and situations where Italy 
would maximise its gains from burden-sharing. On the contrary, multiple subsequent crises may have created 
a more favourable context where the sense of solidarity between EU members has increased as a whole.  
In the analysis we argue that, in Italy, public support for EU cooperation largely depends on instrumental 
calculation and finds a particularly favourable moment during the coronavirus pandemic. Italians largely 
support pan-European burden-sharing of the challenges and imbalances introduced by different crises. We 
expect the demand of Italians for burden-sharing to be particularly strong in the context of the coronavirus 
crisis, a challenge that has not only created a security threat to public health, but also a serious risk for the 
recovery of the economy.  
 We test the impact of instrumentalism on retrospective and prospective assessment of EU integration. 
Indeed, we are interested in understanding how instrumental calculation has impacted the way citizens perceive 
the EU’s past performance and the prospect of enhanced integration. In general, some of the most classic 
studies in the field have emphasised that citizens make their economic calculus about the gains stemming from 
EU integration (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Mc Laren 2006; Hobolt and De Vries 2016). Beyond 
pocketbook rationality, people are also supposed to base their EU attitudes on the expected implications for 
national interests (Banducci et al. 2009; Carrubba 1997; Hobolt and Leblond 2009; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). 
Countries in serious troubles and with social malaise could benefit from EU aid to member states; in these 
cases citizens might see the EU as a rescuer and ‘swallow their national pride’ in favour of economic gains 
(Garry and Tilley 2009: 367; see also Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Clements et al. 2014). According to this 
literature, EU citizens are able to make a rational evaluation of the economic consequences of European 
integration both for themselves (egocentric utilitarianism) and for their country (sociotropic utilitarianism) 
(Hooghe & Marks 2009; Serricchio 2012). In the analysis, we refer to two aspects of instrumentalism. We 
argue that, in the context of the pandemic, as long as it is perceived as improving the interests of their own 
countries, as well as their own interests, EU integration receives a positive assessment from citizens. Hence, 
we formulate the first two hypotheses that we aim to test in our work. 
 
H1 – Believing that the EU has given adequate support to their own country during the pandemic positively 
influences citizens’ attitudes to the EU.  
H2 – Perceiving that the pandemic has produced costs on their own interests makes turning to the EU for 
protection more likely. 
 
Instrumental calculation also pertains to the capacity of domestic institutions to manage crises. In general, 
higher levels of dissatisfaction with national government institutions may favour positive stances towards the 








pandemic might not garner sufficient trust; in this case it might be considered rational to call on European 
intervention. We expect that those who were not satisfied with the management of the coronavirus emergency 
by domestic governing institutions would be more likely to turn to the EU for protection. Thus, we formulate 
our third hypothesis. 
 
H3 – Believing that domestic institutions are unable to manage the pressure of the pandemic makes turning 
to the EU for protection more likely. 
   
In the following sections, we explore the relationship between Italian public opinion and the EU, with a 
specific interest in understanding how the coronavirus crisis may affect such a relationship and under the 
assumption that our case study may also be revealing as to how a crisis context can produce effects on the 
popular legitimacy of the EU. To explain the apparent paradox of why Italians decreasingly feel that their 
country benefits from the EU but still want to increase EU cooperation in certain areas, we test our hypotheses 
on the public’s instrumental approach to the principle of burden-sharing: citizens build a more positive image 
of EU integration if this is believed to help face the costs of the most pressing crises affecting the country. 
From a theoretical point of view, our findings may rejuvenate classical theory on European integration, in 
which many scholars (Milward 1999; Moravcsik 1993) sustain that the main rationale behind the EU 
integration process is the rescue of the nation-state from the most pressing problems of transnational scope 
which the state itself is unable to handle effectively. Classical theory is mainly interested in explaining the 
decision of national governments to pool sovereignty at the EU level. Through the same lens, we provide 
justification for the apparent paradox that when EU member states are exposed to crises, their citizens may 
request EU intervention even if they are sceptical of the positivity of EU membership for them in general. 
Especially in the case of transnational crises, the ability of the state to handle the most pressing challenges 
(such as those pertaining to health security, or to an economic recession) might not garner sufficient trust from 
citizens who turn to the EU for protection. Hence, at least in some countries, the Covid-19 crisis may create 
an opening for public support for stronger collective European action.  
To test our hypotheses, we use data from the IAI-LAPS1 survey, conducted on a sample of Italian citizens 
aged 18 and older. Respondents were recruited from a CINT’s opt-in panel, using a quota sampling method 
with gender (male, female), age-group (18-34, 35-54, 55+) and region (NUTS1) as quota control variables. In 
order to improve the quality of the data, in line with Baker et al. (2010), we removed from the analysis those 
respondents who completed the interview in less than 50% of the median time spent by the whole sample to 
take the survey, ending up with 1,562 valid cases. Post-stratification weights based on gender, age-group, 
region, and educational attainment were applied to reflect the actual demographic composition of Italy’s adult 
population. The questionnaire was administered in Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) mode and 
centrally managed by the Laboratory for Political Analysis (LAPS) hosted at the University of Siena. The 
fieldwork took place between 24 and 28 April 2020, two months after the first coronavirus cases were 
diagnosed and when the country was under full lockdown. Although focusing mostly on foreign policy, the 
survey also asked questions concerning the perceived impact of the coronavirus emergency and about attitudes 
towards several actors (including the EU) in the context of the pandemic. The survey was carried out before 
the EU approved its long-term budget, coupled with NextGenerationEU, the largest stimulus package ever 
financed by the EU to help rebuild a post-COVID-19 Europe. Accordingly, the survey reflects the situation of 
the time, before approval of the EU rescue package. It is very likely that the public mood has changed 
 
1 The survey used in this research was funded by the Istituto Affari Internazionali. 
  
 






substantially since this game changer. Through our analysis, it is thus possible to assess the likely reception of 
the EU intervention on this occasion, as well as the impact it could make on EU legitimacy in this country. 
  
 
3. Europhilia over? Not necessarily… Tracing Italian public opinion attitudes 
towards the EU 
 
The explanations behind the long-term negative trend in the attitudes of the Italian public towards the EU 
have been addressed by several authors. In general, these show that economic concerns and perceived threats 
to national identity (namely immigration) were the two main determinants behind the rise of Eurosceptic 
attitudes among Italians even before the multiple crises that have affected Europe in the recent past (Bellucci 
2014; Conti and Memoli 2015; Di Mauro 2014; Franchino and Segatti 2019; Quaglia 2011; Serricchio 2012). 
Indeed, the growing Euroscepticism of the Italian public (even compared to other Southern European countries, 
see on this point Teperoglou and Belchior 2020) can be first understood in the light of the main policy 
paradigms pursued by the EU, as these have often appeared to be on a collision course with the national 
interests of Italians. The competitive pressures induced by the EU through the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and through enlargement to new member states have created concerns within Italian society (Bellucci 
and Serricchio 2012). Within the Eurozone, member states have lost a great deal of scope for independent 
action in areas such as monetary policy and trade. This has induced a real paradigm shift in Italy where, for 
instance, the competitive devaluation of the national currency to make Italian goods more economical, and the 
gigantic state debt to finance generous public expenditure have become policies of the past, impossible to 
pursue under the EMU. Moreover, other EU countries – especially in Central and Eastern Europe – have 
become attractive for business and have induced many Italian entrepreneurs to delocalise to other regions of 
the EU (in addition to the global trend of business delocalisation to low wage extra-EU countries). Owing to 
the free movement of people, the number of economic immigrants from EU countries has increased in Italy. 
Ultimately, under the impact of the multiple (i.e., economic and migration) crises that have affected the EU, 
all these tensions have been exacerbated in Italy, one of the most exposed countries.   
The two lines in Figure 1 show the percentages of people who perceive EU membership as beneficial and 
think that EU membership is a good thing. These indicators of the Eurobarometer survey point to different 
dimensions of the EU integration process, such as integration in encompassing terms (membership) and policy 
outcomes (benefit). Both lines in the graph tend to decline sharply, especially in the crisis years. Despite some 
fluctuations, the overall downturn is striking, also when considered from a long-term perspective. The 
association between the two lines appears evident: it shows that the less citizens perceive the EU as creating 
benefits for their own country, the less they support their own country’s membership in the EU. In 1991, 79% 
of Italians considered their country’s membership to be a good thing, but by 2019 this percentage had more 
than halved (38%). In 1990, 69% of Italians thought their country had benefited from EU membership, while 
by 2019 this percentage had fallen to 44%. These trends in Italian public opinion appear even more critical 
when compared to the pan-European tendency. Until the early 2000s, Italy showed higher values than the EU 
average on both indicators, while by the mid-2010s the situation was completely reversed as European 
averages were 23% (benefit) and 21% (membership) higher than the Italian averages, respectively (data not 
shown). This situation and how it has evolved over time prompted authors such as Teperoglou and Belchior 








Also in the context of the pandemic, Italian public opinion has shown its critical relationship with the EU. 
To provide evidence of such a relationship, we use data from the public opinion survey conducted during the 
first national lockdown by the Istituto Affari Internationali (IAI) and the LAPS Laboratory of the University 
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Figure 1 - Trends of indicators of citizens’ support for the EU in Italy, 1990–2019.
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer (various years) and Parlameter (2015) data. Information not available for some years (the 
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of Siena.  
In order to connect the EU attitudes of the public with the actual context of the pandemic, we took into 
consideration three specific aspects (figure 2). Firstly, we considered people’s evaluation of the response to 
the coronavirus crisis (EU support to Italy). The item used for this purpose is a question about the adequacy of 
the EU support given to Italy in this specific crisis2. We found that, by the time the survey was carried out, an 
impressive 79% of respondents gave a negative evaluation of the support given by the EU to Italy (compared 
to 21% who thought that this support was adequate). Once again, we find evidence of the fact that citizens’ 
expectations were frustrated by the EU’s (lack of) intervention, at least in the initial phase of the pandemic. 
This information reinforces long-term evidence of the rise of dissatisfaction with the EU among Italian public 
opinion.  
Among the likely explanations for this markedly negative assessment, there could be an overestimation by 
citizens of the capacity and competence of the EU to intervene in crisis situations and in fields that are typically 
of national competence, such as health. The mechanism of assigning responsibility for outcomes normally 
relies on the assumption that individuals are able to assess past performance and we are aware that the task of 
assigning responsibility is complicated in the European multi-level system, in which citizens face the 
additional challenge of distinguishing between the powers of multiple levels of government. On the one hand, 
responsibility attribution might be challenging for citizens, since the multiplicity of institutional tiers in 
European multi-level governance can make the distinction between national or EU responsibility somewhat 
blurred. On the other hand, national politicians have gradually learned the potential of blame shifting to the 
EU when citizens are unhappy with outcomes, as a critical assessment of the EU and its blaming can be 
strategic ways to diffuse responsibility (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). In the end, regardless of whether it is 
exaggerated or not, citizens recognise the large range of competences acquired by the EU and for this reason 
they consider the same EU a main target for attributional processes, especially in crisis situations. 
Secondly, we examined citizens’ evaluation of the impact of the pandemic on the EU itself. We use here 
the question item measuring respondents’ agreement with the statement ‘the pandemic has shown the definitive 
failure of the EU’ (EU failure)3. An overwhelming majority agree with this statement (73%), thus confirming 
the decidedly pessimistic EU posture of Italian citizens (at least in the initial phase of the pandemic). 
Thirdly, we examined whether Italians would be willing to support greater cooperation to fight against crisis 
situations. We thus selected from the survey an item asking whether further cooperation between states is 
preferable in such situations as compared to greater state independence (Cooperation)4. In the European 
continent, citizens certainly conceive of international and European cooperation as being two sides of the same 
coin. Although not explicitly referring to the process of EU integration, this question can be used as proxy of 
people’s willingness to establish greater cooperation – including EU cooperation – when facing the pandemic 
as opposed to exclusive national solutions. Interestingly, 63% of citizens declared to be in favour of greater 
cooperation. When the question specifies ‘European cooperation’ (not simply international cooperation), the 
same result is even reinforced, as shown by another survey conducted in the same period (European Council 
on Foreign Relations 2020) to which Italian citizens responded in even larger numbers (77%) that the pandemic 
proves the need for greater European cooperation.  
 
2 Question’s wording was: ‘Do you think that the EU has provided adequate or inadequate support to Italy to manage the difficulties 
due to the recent health crisis of Coronavirus?’ 
3 Question’s wording was: ‘Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements on the political 
consequences of the coronavirus pandemic: The pandemic has shown the definitive failure of the European Union’. 
4 Question’s wording: ‘According to some, the coronavirus emergency shows the need for greater cooperation between states to face 
global challenges. On the contrary, according to others, the coronavirus emergency shows the need for greater independence of our 
state from other states. With which of the two above statements are you more in agreement?’ 
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Figure 2 - Attitudes of Italian public opinion toward solutions to the coronavirus emergency. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of data of Istituto Affari internazionali and University of Siena, Laboratory for Political Analysis (LAPS) (May 2020). 
50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
In favour of greater international cooperation to face global crises
EU aid to Italy to handle coronavirus health emergency inadequate
The coronavirus pandemic shows the failure of the EU
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The data presented above show a sense of the profound disenchantment of Italian citizens with the role 
played by the EU during the first wave of the pandemic: its (lack of) intervention was considered a failure by 
a large majority of respondents. In particular, there was consensus that aid to Italy to face the challenge of the 
health emergency was insufficient. In our view, this can be seen as evidence of the role assigned by public 
opinion to the EU as a rescuer and a shield against those challenges that the state has difficulty in addressing 
and where European-level coordination may produce more efficient responses. Indeed, despite past failure, 
from our analysis (and in line with other recent works, see Conti et al. 2020) a large majority of Italians appear 
in favour of greater cooperation between states to fight global crises. 
Against this background, we decided to explore whether and to what extent citizens’ views about the EU 
response to the coronavirus crisis (EU support to Italy) actually affect their perception of the process of EU 
integration (EU failure) and their support for cooperation between states to face crises (Cooperation).  
A cross-tabulation (Table 1) reveals that those holding a negative assessment of EU support to Italy are also 
more likely (79%) to agree with the statement that the pandemic has unearthed the EU failure, than those 
considering the EU support adequate (52%). On the contrary, those who considered the EU support to Italy 
adequate (48%) are more likely to disagree with the same statement on the failure of the EU process than those 
sharing a critical evaluation (21%).  Data point to the fact that the unfulfilled expectations concerning EU 
support to the country translate into a pessimistic prospective assessment of EU integration. The difference 
between the two groups is statistically significant (Pearson’s χ2= 94.1120, p<0.001).   
However, when considering views on Cooperation, even if the relationship is still statistically significant 
(Pearson’s χ2= 24.5253, p<0.001), the impact of EU support to Italy is less straightforward. Indeed, among 
those encouraging further cooperation, the gap between those who consider the support given by the EU 
inadequate and those who consider it adequate is narrower than that observed for EU failure (65% and 79%, 
respectively).  
 
Table 1 - EU failure and international cooperation, by perception of EU support to Italy. 
 EU support to Italy 
The pandemic has shown EU failure Inadequate Adequate 
Agree 79 52 
Disagree 21 48 
The COVID-19 pandemic reveals the need for…     
Greater cooperation between states 65 80 
Greater independence of our country from other states 35 20 
Total 100 100 
N 1231 331 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of data of Istituto Affari Internazionali and University of Siena, Laboratory for Political Analysis 
(LAPS) (May 2020). 
 
The above outlined picture indicates that, in the initial phase of the pandemic captured by our survey, this 
new crisis raised disillusionment about the EU integration project and its ability to effectively address global 
challenges, something likely to discourage trust in more far-reaching processes of supranational integration. 
As argued in a recent work (de Wilde 2021), crises may push indifferent people to sway one way or the other 
and this was also the case in Italy during the pandemic (Bobba and Seddone 2021). Hence, the widespread 
  
 






pessimism about EU integration in Italian public opinion could be a sign of the fact that the pandemic marked 
a decline in net support for the EU.  
Nonetheless, such disillusionment does not seem to lead to an outright claim for more independence and 
defence of state sovereignty. As a possible interpretation of this apparent paradox, we propose the argument 
that the pandemic reveals a form of Euroscepticism in Italy that is conditional rather than principled. On the 
one hand, there is consensus in the country about the need for greater cooperation and burden-sharing, a stance 
that implies acknowledgement of a coordination role for the EU. On the other hand, however, the (perceived) 
failure of the EU to deliver positive gains produces disillusionment in the public that translates into 
Euroscepticism despite the broad conviction about the need for further EU cooperation and that the state has 
no future in standing alone to face crises.    
Of course, we know that gains are difficult to attain, differences in interest between countries are great, and 
intergovernmental negotiations on recovery plans are lengthy and oriented to compromise more than to gaining 
maximisation. In this respect, in the recent past, Italian political leaders have appeared to be influenced more 
than previously by public sentiment with regard to the EU in their immediate context and have made efforts 
to be more responsive to (or in tune with) their national public as regards their feelings about European 
integration and the EU role (Conti et al. 2020b). The Italian government, in particular, has made great efforts 
to negotiate an agreement on a recovery plan that could help repair the economic and social damage brought 
about by the coronavirus pandemic. The agreement reached on the EU budget, and particularly on the Recovery 
Fund, in the summer of 2020 was greeted with great enthusiasm across the broad political spectrum (including 
shares of the opposition), and by the domestic media, business and unions. This step appears to go very much 
in the intended direction of citizens’ demands; it might well balance out their disappointment in the EU’s lack 






In order to move from a descriptive to an explanatory analysis, we considered EU failure and Cooperation 
as dependent variables. Both dependent variables were recoded into dummy variables, with 1 indicating more 
pro-integration stances (no failure and support for cooperation) and 0 if otherwise. 
As to the independent variables of the analysis, we considered a set of factors. For the test of hypothesis 1, 
we considered EU response to the pandemic, measured by the survey item on the perception of the support 
given by the EU to Italy, with 1 indicating adequate support and 0 inadequate support.  We expect that those 
who perceive the support given to Italy as adequate will be more likely to hold more optimistic views with 
respect to the dependent variables.   
For the test of hypothesis 2, we considered the impact of the pandemic on the life of respondents in both 
financial and social terms5. The expectation here is that those individuals who have suffered more because of 
the pandemic should be more willing to look for solutions beyond the state borders, turning to the EU with the 
hope of improving the status quo.  
 
5 Survey questions used: ‘To what extent have you and your family been affected by the current health crisis due to the coronavirus, 
on the financial aspect (question 1)/on the aspect of social isolation (question 2)?’ Answers: A Lot/Somewhat recoded as 1=High 
Impact; A Little/Nothing recoded as 0=Low Impact. Overall, 55% reported a high financial impact, and 74% a high impact in terms 









Table 2 - Logistic regression on Disagree on EU failure and Agree on Cooperation. 
  
Evaluation of the EU after the pandemic 
(1=disagree on EU failure; 0= agree on EU 
failure)  
International Cooperation 
(Cooperation =1, States’ 
independence=0) 
Adequate support to Italy 2.734*** 1.221 
 (0.450) (0.227) 
High Financial impact 0.464*** 1.223 
 (0.0712) (0.175) 
High Social impact 1.190 1.201 
 (0.206) (0.178) 
Satisfaction with national 
government 2.341*** 1.934*** 
 (0.513) (0.367) 
Satisfaction with regional 
government 1.209 1.418* 
 (0.199) (0.204) 
Left 1.078 1.152 
 (0.199) (0.242) 
Right 0.569* 0.704 
 (0.127) (0.132) 
Not LR 0.981 0.748 
 (0.214) (0.142) 
M5S 0.646 0.681 
 (0.154) (0.168) 
PD 1.189 0.780 
 (0.278) (0.233) 
Lega 0.860 0.733 
 (0.233) (0.177) 
FdI 0.756 0.859 
 (0.250) (0.223) 
Abstained/null 0.857 0.819 
 (0.188) (0.185) 
EU integration is not possible 0.362** 0.563** 
 (0.113) (0.122) 
Vote Remain in the EU 4.450*** 5.915*** 
 (1.279) (1.711) 
I would not vote 4.567*** 2.568* 
 (1.846) (1.194) 
EU impossible # Vote Remain 0.792 0.912 
 (0.284) (0.304) 
  
 






EU impossible # Would not vote 0.442 0.890 
 (0.242) (0.476) 
Occupation   
Freelance 1.380 1.445 
 (0.355) (0.350) 
Not permanent job 0.921 1.390 
 (0.255) (0.335) 
Unemployed 1.004 1.262 
 (0.227) (0.250) 
Not at work 1.158 1.223 
 (0.227) (0.225) 
Other 0.982 1.248 
 (0.419) (0.432) 
Income 0.921** 1.041 
 (0.0269) (0.0261) 
Age 1.002 1.005 
 (0.00555) (0.00544) 
Woman 0.779 0.646** 
 (0.115) (0.0881) 
Education   
High education 1.140 1.051 
 (0.290) (0.206) 
University/PhD 1.680 1.496 
 (0.473) (0.331) 
Observations 1,559 1,557 
Mc Fadden Adj. R2 0.238                     0.167 
Note:  
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
Source: Own elaboration of data of Istituto Affari internazionali and University of Siena, Laboratory for Political Analysis (LAPS) 
(May 2020). 
 
For the test of hypothesis 3, we introduced satisfaction with how the national government managed the 
pandemic6. We expect that those who were not satisfied would be more likely to turn to the EU for protection 
against the pandemic. We built an index with the average evaluation of different government actors, namely 
the Government, the Prime Minister and the Health, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs Ministers (Cronbach’s 
alpha= 0.85). Overall, on a 0-1 scale, answers indicate a medium-to-high level of public satisfaction with the 
 
6 The question was: ‘In your opinion, in the crisis following the spread of coronavirus in Italy, has the role of the following actors 
been positive or negative?’ Answer options were on a 1-4 points scale, from Very Positive to Very Negative. All variables were 








Italian government (0.6). We also included in the model a variable on the assessment of the role of the Regional 
President, but we kept it separate from the index measuring the national government evaluation. In Italy, 
regions hold significant powers, especially in health policy, and their role in fighting the pandemic has been 
prominent (as well as varied), often giving rise to tensions with the national government. On the whole, Italians 
appear to appreciate the role played by regional presidents (67%), although there are large variations across 
geographic areas (from 86% in the north east to 54% in the centre).  
In order not to overestimate the impact of instrumentalism, as is customary in this kind of analysis, we 
introduced some control variables into the models. In particular, we introduced ideology, generally considered 
a cognitive shortcut for citizens’ preferences and attitudes. We operationalised ideology as preferences along 
the left-right continuum7, vote intention and also preferences along the EU dimension of political competition. 
For the measurement of the latter, in particular, we used two items from the IAI-LAPS survey: the first refers 
to a question about integrating diversity in the EU8 (in the sample, 64% of the population think EU integration 
is not possible because we are too different). The second item consists of people’s willingness to vote for Italy 
leaving the EU9, a privileged platform for right-wing populist Eurosceptic parties. However, since propensity 
to leave the EU might be dependent on people’s underlying attitudes towards integration itself, the above two 
variables are included as interaction in the models. 
Finally, we introduced socio-demographic controls such as gender, age, education and occupation. 
Results from a logistic regression analysis (odds ratios shown in the output) confirm the expectation that a 
positive evaluation of the EU support given to Italy is 2.7 times more likely to convey a more positive image 
of the EU, all other variables being constant. On the contrary, the same variable does not have a significant 
impact on the demand for further cooperation. This suggests that Italians welcome greater cooperation 
regardless of how they retrospectively judge EU performance during the pandemic. Our H1 is thus only 
confirmed with respect to retrospective assessment of the EU process, not with respect to prospective 
integration10.  
  Similarly, those who think the pandemic produced a high financial impact on their household tend to agree 
on EU failure but, again, this does not have a significant impact on preferences for cooperation. Conversely, 
the social impact of the pandemic seems irrelevant in shaping any retrospective or prospective evaluation of 
the EU. As a result, our H2 can only partially be confirmed and only with respect to retrospective EU 
integration. 
Interestingly, satisfaction goes in the opposite direction to that expected, with a positive evaluation of 
governing institutions leading to a higher likelihood (2.3 times more) of a benevolent perception of the EU 
process and a (1.9 times) greater inclination to support further cooperation. This result may suggest a possible 
spill-over effect of satisfaction from national institutions to EU institutions during the crisis, but more research 
is needed. It is also useful to note that a positive evaluation of the performance of the regional government is 
 
7 Ideology was expressed on a 0-10-point scale, with a further option available to those who do not feel close to any of these sides of 
the continuum. This variable was recoded as follows: 0-3=Left, 4-6=Centre; 7-10=Right, plus the not attached. 
8 The survey item was: ‘European unification is not possible because we are too different’; answer options range from Strongly 
Agree to Do Not Agree At All.  
9 In the survey, the question was asked differently to two halves of the sample, with the first one asked about leaving the EU and the 
second one about leaving the Euro. Answers revealed not significant differences between the two splits, so the variables have been 
merged into one. Overall, 46% of respondents would vote for exit (49% if the EU is mentioned, 44% if the Euro is mentioned). 
10 We should also add that the regression analysis has only confirmed the relationship between two variables, but we cannot exclude 
that the direction of such a relationship could also be reversed. In other words, we cannot exclude that a more positive image of the 
EU conveys the idea that the EU is acting in the interests of one’s own country. 
  
 






only significant for support for further cooperation. We interpret this result as citizens’ increasing propensity 
to conceive of the response to global challenges under a multi-level governance approach, where the local 
level shares competencies with supranational institutions. The relationship posited in H3 is thus confirmed but 
it goes in the opposite direction to that expected. 
As to the control variables, with respect to ideological leaning, people on the right tend to hold more 
pessimistic views about the EU process. Those respondents who consider it impossible to integrate diversity 
in the EU convey more negative views on both dependent variables, while the opposite is true for those who 
would vote ‘remain’ in a referendum on Italexit.   
Among socio-demographics, only income and gender play a significant role in the model; in particular, 
pessimistic views about the EU increase as income becomes higher, while women tend to show lower support 
for cooperation than men. All other variables do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: the Coronavirus and the EU as a rescuer 
 
This article aims to explain public support for EU integration when exogenous crises severely affect a 
political community. Our analysis has focused on Italy, a country where public support for the EU has 
gradually waned, but where there is still demand from some majoritarian segments of society for stronger EU 
cooperation in the domains most affected by crises (including the coronavirus crisis). To explain the apparent 
paradox of why Italians decreasingly feel that their country benefits from the EU but still want to increase EU 
involvement in certain areas, we turned to the argument of the public’s instrumental approach to the principle 
of burden-sharing: Italians support burden-sharing to face the costs of the most pressing crises affecting EU 
countries. We discussed how this posture is not only associated with the coronavirus emergency but finds its 
roots in the multiple crises that have affected the EU in the recent past. Of course, burden-sharing requires that 
people feel part of a broader cohesive group whose members are expected to monitor and mutually support 
each other. Whereas these are established achievements of the nation state (Rusu and Gheorghiță 2014), 
solidarity between member states and the delegation of coordination to the EU imply a trade-off between 
solidarity and sovereignty. Acting in solidarity with other member states implies that a state gives up some of 
its independence in domestic decision-making to provide financial assistance to a country in need, allowing 
the EU to coordinate the joint effort (Hayward and Wurzel 2012). Our analysis of the Italian case shows that 
Italian society is ready and willing to go in this direction and that the multiple crises affecting Europe may 
have produced the ideal conditions under which the EU could move a step forward towards deeper integration 
and more solidaristic integration in the future. We suppose that the negative contextual conditions affecting 
Italy are common to other countries as well. Although more research is needed, we argue that through a similar 
mechanism to that in Italy, also in other member states the crisis caused by the pandemic can be conducive to 
a situation where the EU may accrue legitimacy.  
Our study has also contributed to defining Euroscepticism, a conditional posture in Italian society. Here, 
Euroscepticism is not generated from principled opposition to Europe and to the delegation of sovereignty to 
the EU. It is the scope of expectations of the EU (a shield against exogenous shocks) and dissatisfaction with 
the retrospectively assessed outcomes that have created disillusionment within Italian society. Because of the 
effects of multiple urgent crises, there is an opportunity for the EU to increase its legitimacy: its intervention 
is perceived as a helping hand that could rescue the nation state from worse scenarios. We take seriously de 








tendency of public opinion to rebound after a crisis dissipates. In this perspective, not only the scope of EU 
intervention but also its timing can be influential factors to assure a boost in EU legitimacy.     
The implications of our study for the explanation of public attitudes towards the EU are relevant also beyond 
the Italian case. In the future, it would be interesting to observe the relationship between support for burden-
sharing and support for EU cooperation across countries more and less severely hit by crises, to understand to 
what extent under crisis conditions, instrumental support for burden-sharing may work as a catalyst for support 
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